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Abstract. The original formulation of the (weak) anthropic principle was
prompted by a question about objective time at a macroscopic level, namely the
age of the universe when “anthropic” observers such as ourselves would be most
likely to emerge. Theoretical interpretation of what one observes requires the
theory to indicate what is expected, which will commonly depend on where, and
particularly when, the observation can be expected to occur. In response to the
question of where and when, the original version of the anthropic principle proposed
an it a priori probability weighting proportional to the number of “anthropic”
observers present. The present discussion takes up the question of the time unit
characterising the biological clock controlling our subjective internal time, using a
revised alternative to a line of argument due to Press, who postulated that animal
size is limited by the brittleness of bone. On the basis of a static support condition
depending on the tensile strength of flesh rather than bone, it is reasoned here that
our size should be subject to a limit inversely proportional to the surface gravitation
field g, which is itself found to be proportional (with a factor given by the 5/2 power
of the fine structure constant) to the gravitational coupling constant. This provides
an animal size limit that will in all cases be of the order of a thousandth of the
maximum mountain height, which will itself be of the order of a thousandth of the
planetary radius. The upshot, via the (strong) anthropic principle, is that the need
for brains, and therefore planets, that are large in terms of baryon number may be
what explains the weakness of gravity relative to electromagnetism.
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1 Introduction: fundamental parameters.
In this interdisciplinary forum for the discussion of various kinds of time, one of
the first questions that comes to mind is that of the relationship between external
time of the kind measured by physicists in the objective world, and the internal
psychological time characterising successive instants of conscious perception by a
human (or other comparable) mind. As this is something I had previously thought
about in the context [1] of anthropic reasoning for astronomical and other purposes
(notably in the development [2, 3] of a microanthropic principle such as seems
necessary for the interpretation of quantum theory) my objective here will be to
offer a brief account of what emerges from that point of view.
Before recapitulating what is meant by the notion of anthropic reasoning, I
would start by explaining that this essay will will take for granted the usual
paradigm whereby it is assumed that the mind, as perceived from inside, corre-
sponds, in a material physical world, to an organism of the kind known as a brain.
More specifically, the motivation for the following discussion derives from the sup-
position (invoked in previous relevant work by Dyson [4] and Page [5]) that mental
processes are describable in terms of instants of perception characterised by a fi-
nite duration, τ˜ = δt , of time t – interpretable as a basic biological clock unit – as
measured in the physical world wherein the brain is situated. In the human case it
would seem that the shortest biological clock timescale on which coherent mental
processes occur is of the order of a fraction of a second, which is of course why the
latter has been chosen as the standard time measurement unit
It has for more than a century been possible, and for more that half a century
been common usage, to take the fundamental physical measurement units of mass,
of length, and (for our present purpose most pertinent) time to be those of what
is known as the Planck system, which attributes unit value to three particularly
important fundamental parameters. The first of these is the coupling constant G
that was crucial for what was historically the earliest satisfactory physical theory
namely Newtonian gravitation. The second is the propagation speed c that was
crucial for the next great physical theory, namely that of Maxwellian electromag-
netism, which was subsequently unified with gravitation by Einstein. The third
is the more mysterious parameter designated h¯, of which the importance was first
recognised by Planck, but of which the significance was not properly understood
until (synthesising contributions by by Schrodinger, Heisenberg, Born and others)
the principles of modern quantum theory were finally established by Dirac.
An immediate consequence of this astounding breakthrough was to provide
an explanation of the complexity of the chemical behaviour of the elements, as
described by Mendleef’s puzzling periodic table, in terms of just a single dimen-
sionless coupling constant, namely the charge of the electron, whose square, the fine
structure constant αe = e
2, is given approximately, in these units, by e2
.
= 1/137,
while a complete account of low energy physics on a local scale required only one
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more dimensionless parameter namely the electron proton mass ratio me/mp
.
=
1/1830 which is important for the properties of liquid helium. These values, and
those of the Yukawa coupling constant α
Y
.
= 2/7 and the pion proton mass ratio
mπ/mp
.
= 1/7 that play an analogous role in the much less complete theory of
strong interactions introduced about the same time, were fundamental in the sense
of being obtainable only by empirical observation. Early hopes that they would
soon be obtainable by calculation from some deeper theory remain unfulfilled half
a century later.
Although there has of course been progress in the derivation of Yukawa’s rudi-
mentary pion coupling model from more sophisticated strong interaction theories
involving quarks and gluons, this has been done only by introducing even more
adjustable parameters than before, so the outcome is that the value of the effective
coupling constant α
Y
still remains something known only by empirical measure-
ment . Therefor to account for the value of this and other such quantities, there
is now more interest than ever in what I called the strong anthropic principle [6].
This means an approach whereby the quantities in question are postulated to have
values that vary over observationally inaccessible parts of what recently come to
be known [7] as a multiverse, within which our own region has been selected by the
existence of – and therefor environmental suitability for – observers like ourselves.
As the prototype candidate for such a selection effect, I had drawn attention
[8] to the observed Yukawa coupling relation
α
Y
.
= 2mπ/mp , (1)
that is well known as the condition for the nuclear coupling to be marginally strong
enough for the formation of a deuteron by binding of a proton and a neutron within
the distance fixed by the pion mass. As consequently remarked by Dyson [9] and
confirmed by subsequent calculations [10], a relatively small respective decrease
or increase in this coupling would suffice to provide a chemically sterile universe
consisting exclusively of hydrogen, or containing none at all.
Whereas most such fundamental coupling coupling constants were found to
have values more or less comparable with unity, Dirac was impressed by the fact
that there is an exception. Compared with their electromagnetic attraction, the
gravitational attraction between an electron and a proton is weaker by an enormous
factor of the order of 1040, a number that is interpretable as roughly the inverse
of the product of the mass of these particles, as given in Planck units roughly by
me ≈ 10
−22 and mp ≈ 10
−19, so that their geometric mean square value is given in
very round figures by
memp ≈ 〈m〉
2 ≈ 10−40 . (2)
The point to which I wish to draw attention here – and for which at the end I shall
offer a tentative explanation – is that in terms of such Planck units the fraction of
a second time unit characterising our mental (and other biological) processes has
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a value of about the same enormous order of magnitude, namely
τ˜ ≈ 1040 . (3)
2 Dirac’s coincidence
Dirac himself drew attention, not to the coincidence I have just mentioned,, but
to another coincidence involving the same number, which is that it is roughly the
square root of the number N ≈ 1080 of protons (or equivalently, by charge neutral-
ity, of electrons) in the visible universe, meaning the volume characterised by the
cosmological Hubble radius, which was first measured (though not very accurately)
about the same time (three quarters of a century ago) that the principles of modern
quantum theory were first established. It was Dirac’s mistaken explanation for this
highly significant coincidence that prompted me to provide an explicit formulation
of what I called the anthropic principle.
Dirac’s idea was based on the supposition that we are observing at a random
– so presumably typical – instant in the history of our expanding universe, so if
(for whatever reason) the inverse of the gravitational coupling constant is presently
equal to the square root of the number of particles in the visible volume determined
by the Hubble expansion rate then it should be expected to remain so. Since the
visible volume will include progressively more and more particles as the universe
expands, it would follow that the gravitational coupling should become correspond-
ingly weaker.
When I first read about this (in Bondi’s classic textbook [11] on cosmology) I re-
alised that there was a weak link in Dirac’s reasoning, namely his implicit adoption
of what I would criticise as an ubiquity principle rather than the anthropic prin-
ciple that seems appropriate. The essential content of what I called the anthropic
principle is that, a priori, our location in space or time should not be considered
as random with just with respect to the corresponding ordinary physical measure
of space or time (as in what I would call an ubiquity principle) but with respect to
a measure that is anthropically weighted in the sense of being proportional to the
population density of individuals comparable with ourselves.
It has since become observationally clear that the conclusion to which Dirac
was drawn by his misguided line of reasoning was indeed wrong, since his predicted
(cosmological rapid) weakening of gravitation does not actually occur. Already,
even before this was as obvious as it is now, the weak point in Dirac’s line of rea-
soning had been noticed by Dicke [12] (an advocate of another theory of progressive
weakening of gravity, but at a much slower and so less easily measurable rate) who
preceded my own contribution [6] in pointing out that observers comparable to our-
selves (which is what I meant by the adjective anthropic) could not possibly have
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existed when the age of our expanding universe was much less than the lifetime of
a typical hydrogen burning star, and could be expected to become relatively rare
when the universe is much older that that. The (then recently discovered) reason
for the lower cut off is that such hydrogen burning is the only way of fabricating
the medium and heavy elements of which we are made. The (more obvious) rea-
son for the upper time limitation on the relevant anthropic weighting measure is
the dependence of life systems such as ours on energy input from a neighbouring
star, and of the fact that although later generations of such stars will continue to
be formed they will become progressively rarer as the matter that was originally
present is transformed is transformed into unavailable end states such as cold dead
neutron stars and black holes.
Although Dirac was wrong in his conclusion of weakening of gravitation with
time, it appears that he was right in deducing that there is a direct connection
between the the strength of gravity and the number of particles in the universe as
presently observed. The coincidence he noted is that the value, roughly 1080, of
N is roughly the inverse square of the value, roughly 10−40, of the gravitational
coupling constant that is itself given very roughly as square of the proton mass mp.
Dirac’s coincidence is thus roughly expressible in Planck units simply as
N ≈ m−4p . (4)
A first step in what now appears to be the correct explanation of this is the
recognition that, as has been known since Newton’s time, the dynamical timescale t
associated with the free self gravitational acceleration of a body with mass density
ρ will (remembering our units here are such that G = 1) be given roughly by
ρ ≈ 1/t2. In the cosmological case (remembering our units are such that c = 1)
the relevant Hubble radius will be of the same order as the age t, so the order
magnitude of the mass in the visible volume will be given roughly by M ≈ ρ t3 ≈ t
which means that the corresponding number N of particles with mass mp will be
given by N ≈ t/mp. Dirac’s coincidence is therefore equivalent to the (directly
verifiable) observation that the present age, t⋆ say, of the universe is given very
roughly by
t⋆ ≈ m
−3
p , (5)
which in very round figures comes out to be something like 1060.
3 Explanation from stellar physics
To explain Dirac’s coincidence on the basis of the anthropic line of reasoning that
was implicitly followed by Dicke, it suffices to work out the typical lifetime τ ⋆ of a
main sequence star, something that was first understood, on the basis of work by
Eddington and others, about the same time as Dirac was clarifying the essential
principles of quantum theory. Since a star is held together by gravity, it is not
5
Figure 1: Logarithmic plot of inverse density against mass for the main kinds of
stellar and planetary bodies, as accounted for [13] (on the basis of work by pioneers
such as Eddington and Chandrasekhar) in terms just of the masses and charge of
the proton and the electron.
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surprising (see my recent recapitulation [13]) that its properties should be essen-
tially determined by the gravitational coupling strength: the essential conclusions
are that typically (give or take one or two factors of ten) the mass M ⋆ will be
given roughly by M ⋆ ≈ m
−2
p , while its lifetime, which is what we are principally
concerned with here, will be given by τ ⋆ ≈ εNM ⋆/L where L is its luminosity, and
ε
N
is the nuclear binding energy which, on account of (1), will be expressible simply
as ε
N
≈ (2mπ/mp)
2 . The luminosity is sensitive to the stellar mass, and is given by
a rather complicated formula [8] for small slow burning stars. However for larger
brighter stars of the kind that manufactured our heavy elements one can use the
simple Eddington luminosity formula L/M⋆ ≈ mpm
2
e /e
4 which gives
τ ⋆ ≈ (2 e
2mπ/me)
2m−3p . (6)
Since (in our part of the universe, if not elsewhere) the factor e2mπ/me happens
to be of order unity, it is evident that (at the admittedly rather crude level of
accuracy involved) the agreement with (5) is perfect: the coincidence is explained,
and the essential role of gravity confirmed. However instead of providing evidence
for a radically new theory as foreseen by Dirac, the explanation merely confirms
what was already the established understanding of the situation. Dirac’s persistent
refusal to accept this (from his point of view disappointing) outcome shows that,
despite the fact that it ultimately contributes nothing new in such a case, the
anthropic principle is not merely a tautology. Indeed, whereas Dirac’s inclination
was to spread the a priori probability measure too widely, a more common kind of
deviation from the anthropic principle is to spread it too restrictively. Both kinds
of deviation tend to be motivated by wishful thinking, typically unwillingness to
accept the limitations, particularly concerning future prospects, that are involved
in unbiased application of the anthropic principle.
4 Anthropic or autocentric forecast
An extreme, but not unusual, example of a non-anthropic principle of the restric-
tive kind is that of what I would call the autocentric principle, whose application
consists in a (logically admissible, but for predictive purposes sterile) refusal to
attribute any a priori probability at all to situations other than that in which one
has already found oneself a posteriori. (As a recent proponent [14] puts it “what
other hypothetical observers with data different from ours might see, how many
of them there are, and what properties they might or might not share with us are
irrelevant”)
Recourse to such an autocentric standpoint may be a temptation for advocates
[15] of scenarios in which the population of our terrestrial civilisation is maintained
indefinitely at a sustainable level (as envisaged by ecologists) or even conceived
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Figure 2: Future of terrestrial human population, as envisaged circa 1980. The high
scenario of continued quasi-exponential growth is already excluded by observation,
leaving as possibilities the medium scenario of sigmoid growth toward saturation at
“sustainable” level – (which is however unlikely according to anthropic reasoning)
and the low scenario of quasi-normal evolution (which is most realistic in view of
the exhaustion of non-renewable resources).
to undergo continued growth (as desired by economists). Whereas the autocentric
principle is compatible with (neither encouraging nor discouraging) such scenarios,
on the other hand, according to the anthropic principle, the integrated future
population of our civilisation can not be expected to greatly exceed the number
that have lived so far, which leaves us with the choice between a sudden cut off
(what has been called [16] the doomsday scenario, due to a catastrophe like a global
war or some kind of environmental disaster) or the less apocalyptic alternative of
a gentle and controlled decline in population, of the kind that seems already to
have begun in some developed countries. It is to be noted that since I first made
such a prediction, about a quarter of a century ago [17], there has already been an
inflection, whereby, according to official United Nations statistics, see Figure 2, the
second time derivative of the global human population has changed sign and become
negative. It is also to be noted that this anthropic prediction concurs with what
is to be expected anyway on the basis of environmental and other considerations,
so much so as to be almost redundant, in the sense that its conclusion can not be
easily escaped even by recourse to autocentrism.
5 Understanding our past evolution
Although it is perhaps of less immediate practical importance, a more intellectu-
ally interesting application [17] of the anthropic principle is concerned with another
remarkable coincidence concerning the stellar lifetime discussed above, and in par-
ticular with the more precise value that can be given to it when one is concerned
not with the whole category of main sequence stars but with a single specific case,
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Figure 3: Probability distribution and expectation value for anthropic arrival time,
firstly if number of difficult steps is zero (high curve), secondly if it is one (middle
curve) and thirdly if it is two (low curve), using dotted lines for extrapolation
beyond the cut-off imposed by the Sun’s lifetime. The expectation value in the
first case is far too low to account for the observation that the present age of the
earth is about half the calculated cut-off time. However the second case, that of
a single difficult step, fits very well, and it is still possible to envisage that there
may have been two difficult steps (or even more if – to allow for rising of the solar
temperature – the standard cut-off calculation needs downward revision).
namely that of our own Sun. The remarkable coincidence (much more precise than
the vague order of magnitude relation that fascinated Dirac) is that the predicted
total hydrogen burning lifetime of the Sun is only about twice the present geolog-
ically measured age of our planet Earth. What this means is that the stochastic
biological evolution process whereby our (at one stage single celled, then worm like,
fish like, and finally mammalian) ancestors developed to become our anthropoid
selves took fully half the astrophysically available time. If this very complicated
and technically (unlike stellar astrophysics) not at all well understood process had
been slower by a modest factor of two our civilisation here would never have got
to exist at all. It is not at all plausible that the intrinsic stochastic mechanism of
such a biological process should have been tuned a priori so as to agree with the
externally imposed astrophysical timescale.
What could have been expected a priori is that in the given planetary environ-
ment, the stochastically expected time scale, t say, for evolution to our anthropi-
cally advanced state would be either very short or else very long compared with
the relevant stellar lifetime. In the former case advanced civilisations would be of
rather common occurrence and the anthropic weighting factor would favour their
emergence when the relevant star was relatively young. Since that is not what we
observe in our own case, we are left, as the only plausible alternative, with the
conclusion that the available time is short compared with the stochastically ex-
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pected timescale, t, which implies that (whereas primitive life may be be relatively
common [18]) advanced civilisations like ours will occur only in rare cases for which
there was an exceptional run of luck. More detailed conclusions can be obtained
by classifying the intermediate evolutionary steps as easy ones, meaning those with
a high chance of going through in the time available, and difficult ones, meaning
those with a low chance of going through in the time available. Our observation
that the Sun is no longer young implies that at least one of the steps must have been
of the difficult kind, but on the other hand the number of difficult steps can not
have been very large since if it had the remaining main sequence time would have
been expected to be much smaller than, not comparable with, the time elapsed so
far.
6 Our planetary environment
The smallest timescales of which we have any actual experimental or observational
knowledge are those of nuclear physical processes for which the relevant timescales
are of the order of m−1p meaning about 10
20 in Planck units. The very long cosmo-
logical, stellar, and biological evolution timescales whose anthropic relationships
have been discussed are of the order of m−3p meaning about 10
60 in Planck units.
Between these very large and very small values, the minimum (fraction of a second)
perception timescale τ˜ referred to in (3) is given by the geometric mean, namely
about 1040 in Planck units. As this happens to be what is recognisably expressible
as m−2p we again find ourselves confronted with the question of whether this is
just an accidental coincidence, or whether, as with Dirac’s coincidence it really is
explicable in terms of gravitational coupling.
A significant step toward such an explanation is contained in the pioneering
investigation of the physical and astrophysical limitations on human space dimen-
sions provided [19] by Press, whose key point was that the dimensions of the host
planet are rather tightly restricted by the requirement that the gravitational field
should be strong enough for binding of water and heavier molecules, but not quite
strong enough for binding of hydrogen. This means that, compared with the square
of the escape velocity, the thermal energy factor given for the atmospheric nitrogen
and oxigen by the square of the sound speed has to be rather (but not too) small
– by a factor of roughly the order of a thousandth.
For marginal gravitational binding of hydrogen atoms (with thermal velocity not
far below the escape velocity) the generic virial equilibrium formula – as explained
in my recent recapitulation [13] – for a planetary or non-relativistic stellar type
body of mass M density ρ and temperature Θ, takes a form given roughly by
M ≈ 10m−3/2p ρ
−1/2Θ3/2. Since on a solid or liquid planet the typical interparticle
separation will be given by the Bohr radius, e−2m−1e , the ensuing mass density
density will be a few times that of water, with order of magnitude ρ ≈ e6m3e mp,
so for hydrogen binding to be marginal the planetary mass must be given roughly
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by M ≈ 10m−2p (Θ/e
2me)
3/2 . Now in order for water to exist in liquid form, the
temperature must be small, but not extremely small, compared with the Rydberg
(electronic binding) energy, and therefor given by an expression of the form
Θ⊕ ≈
1
2
ǫ e4me , (7)
where ǫ is a numerical factor that was taken by Press to be about 3×10−3. On the
basis of these considerations, Press obtained for the radius of an earth like planet
an expression of the form
R⊕ ≈ 2 ǫ
1/2 e−1m−1e m
−1
p . (8)
This corresponds to a mass of given by an expression of the form
M⊕ ≈ 8 ǫ
3/2 e3m−2p , (9)
which is smaller that the value M⊙ ≈ m
−2
p that characterises a typical main
sequence star such as the Sun by a factor of order ǫ3/2e3.
To make the link with local biology what one needs is not the global quan-
tities given by the preceding Press formulae, but the value of the local Galilean
acceleration field given (according to the gravitation law discovered by Hooke but
subsequently named after Newton) by g ≈ M⊕/R
2
⊕
. By a convenient cancellation
(that does not seem to have been previously noticed) it turns out that the result
depends on the mass only of the electron, not the proton, taking the remarkably
simple form
g ≈ 2 ǫ1/2 e5m 2e , (10)
which is only weakly dependent on the small arithmetical factor ǫ, but strongly
dependent on the electron charge e.
7 The weakness of animal flesh.
Having thus discovered what governs the value of our local gravitational field,
we are now faced with the less simple question of how the resulting value of g
affects biological organisms of the kind to which we belong. This is an issue that
I think deserves detailed biophysical investigation. Deviating at this point from
the approach followed by Press [19] – and also from a related approach recently
developed by Page [20] – my own suggestion is that one should think in terms of a
basic biological – or to be more specific, zoological – characteristic velocity, v˜, given
– as a small fraction of the speed of ordinary sound at the relevant temperature,
by a relation of the form
m˜ v˜2 ≈ Θ⊕ , (11)
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in which m˜ is a mass scale characterising relevant large biochemical molecules such
as proteins. This means that it will be expressible by a relation of the form
m˜ ≈ ǫ˜−1mp , (12)
in which (like the Press coefficient ǫ introduced above) the quantity ǫ˜ is a small
arithmetical factor that – for m˜ to be the mass of a typical protein molecule –
should have order of magnitude ǫ˜ ≈ 0.3× 10−4.
This quantity ǫ˜ has the same status as that of the Press coefficient ǫ, in that
the smallness of these quantities is just an arithmetical (in principle calculable)
measure of the complexity of the (molecular, not just atomic) systems involved, and
– contrary to a notion that was suggested, but justifiably criticised by Peierls, in a
related discussion [21] – it has nothing to do with the smallness of the fine structure
constant e2 (whose role is significant only when heavy metals are involved) nor of
the ratiome/mp (which is too small to matter much except for the lightest elements,
namely pure hydrogen and helium, at temperatures far too low for ordinary life).
The foregoing estimate for ǫ˜ is actually interpretable as meaning that the cor-
responding zoological characteristic velocity,
v˜ ≈ e2(ǫ˜ ǫme/mp)
1/2 , (13)
will in our case be about 3 percent of the speed of ordinary sound. This relatively
slow speed is mainly attributable to the very small value of the foregoing estimate
for ǫ˜ , which has nothing to do with the values of physically adjustable coupling
constants, but is an ineluctable concomitant of the flabbiness of flexible flesh, or
even cartilage, as contrasted with the rigidity of woody celluloid matter in plants,
for which the corresponding botanical characteristic velocity would be considerably
higher, though still subsonic. (To emulate the strength of vegetable matter, animal
bodies do of course incorporate rigid bone structure, but the extent to which that is
feasible is limited by the ensuing sacrifice of flexibility and mobility. I therefore dif-
fer from Press [19] in my opinion that the properties of bone itself are of secondary
importance, and that the essential restrictions on animal size are attributable to
the finite strength of the flexible tissues that hold the bones in place.)
Assuming that such a velocity v˜ (of the order of 10 m/sec in our own case)
characterises the relevant energies, pressures, and tensions (as involved for example
in the pumping of blood) in an animal body, it will provides a rough upper limit,
2 g ℓ ∼< v˜
2 , (14)
on the supportable value of the gravitational energy per unit mass associated
with a height difference ℓ between different parts of the body of the organism.
When applied to solid crystalline matter, for which the relevant velocity will be
of the order of that of sound (whose square, as remarked above, must be of the
order of a thousandth of the square of the escape velocity) analogous reasoning [22]
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indicates that the maximum possible height of a mountain will be comparable with
the thickness of the bulk of the atmosphere, and thus of the order of a thousandth
of the planetary radius, which in our terrestrial case provides an (observationally
verifiable) estimate of the of the order of 104 metres.
It is instructive to see how the limit (14) can be derived in a manner similar to
that used by Press [19], who considered the total energy, E˜ say, needed to break the
bonds with energy Θ⊕ binding the molecules on a 2-dimensional shear-disruption
surface with area ℓ2. In terms of the relevant molecular dimension a˜ say (which
for the large protein molecules considered here will be some tens of times larger
than the Bohr radius e−2m−1e ) the number of molecules in the surface layer will
be of order (ℓ/a˜)3 which gives E˜ ≈ Θ⊕(ℓ/a˜)
2 . This disruption energy has to be
supplied by the action of gravity on the mass, M˜ say, in the corresponding volume
of order ℓ3 , which will be given by M˜ ≈ m˜(ℓ/a˜)3 . The viability condition proposed
by Press was that the energy liberated in an animal’s fall through its own height
ℓ should be insufficient to provide the disruption energy, which gives a limit of the
form gM˜ℓ ∼< E˜ .
My own opinion is however that animals can learn how to take care to avoid such
dynamical falls, and that what really matters for viability is the condition for static
support against gravity, which will hold so long as the disruption energy cannot be
provided by a displacement comparable with half the molecular separation distance
a˜, which means that instead of the preceding Press type inequality one gets a limit
of the form gM˜a˜/2 ∼< E˜ , with the factor ℓ replaced by a˜/2. This replacement does
not of course eliminate the dependence on ℓ , which is implicitly involved through
both E˜ and M˜ . Ultimately it is the dependence on a˜ that cancels out, leaving a
static support condition of the simple form (14).
This simple result contrasts with what would be obtained from a dynamical
survivability condition of the kind proposed by Press, which reduces to the not
quite so simple form g ℓ2 ∼< a˜ v˜
2 . For the actual application [19] of this latter
formula to hard bone – instead of the fleshy tissue considered here – the molecular
radius a˜ has to be replaced by the ordinary Bohr radius a0 = e
−2m−1e and the very
low value of the zoological velocity v˜ used here has to be replaced by the much
larger velocity value that is obtainable from (12) or (13). simply by setting ǫ˜ to
unity.
8 Characteristic timescale of human perception
On the basis of the static support condition (14), the preceding considerations
imply that (whereas a land plant or a sea animal may be able to be larger) a
land animal will be able to have at most a maximum size ℓ˜ and a corresponding
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biological clock timescale τ˜ given by
τ˜ ≈
ℓ˜
v˜
≈
v˜
2g
. (15)
Using the preceding estimates (10) and (13) for g and v˜ one obtains the formula
τ˜ ≈ 1/
(
4 e3m3/2e m˜
1/2
)
, (16)
which is independent of the previously introduced Press coefficient ǫ. It does how-
ever have a weak dependence on the newly introduced coefficient ǫ˜ when expressed
in terms of the mean coupling constant 〈m〉2 ≈ 10−40 defined by (2), taking the
form
τ˜ ≈
(ǫ˜ mp/me)
1/2
4 e3〈m〉2
. (17)
Since the factor 1/4 e3 is only of the order of a hundred, and the dimensionless
combination ǫ˜ mp/me can be expected to be rather smaller than unity, it is the
factor 1/〈m〉2 that is overwhelmingly dominant, so the expectation of an essentially
gravitational explanation is confirmed.
9 Strong anthropic reasoning
The idea of what I called the strong anthropic principle [6] was to extend the arena
of application of the weak anthropic principle to scenarios in which the relevant
(anthropically weighted) a priori probability measure is not limited to the part of
the universe about which we have direct observational knowledge, but extended
to other hypothetically existing parts of what may be termed a multiverse [7],
in which fundamental parameters, such as the fine structure constant e2 and the
gravitational coupling constant 〈m〉2, might have values different from those (re-
spectively 1/137 and 10−40) with which we are familiar. In particular I suggested
that given the value of the former (electromagnetic) coupling constant the weak-
ness of the latter (gravitational) coupling constant might be explicable in such a
framework as due to a selection effect – giving it the maximum value, proportional
to a very high (the twelfth) power of the fine structure constant – on the basis of the
requirement of stellar convection [8] as a prerequisite for the necessary planetary
formation.
Starting with the application to the marginal nuclear binding condition (1),
arguments of this strong anthropic kind have since been put forward [23, 24, 25]
to account for relations involving other parameters, such as those controlling weak
interactions. However – in the absence of plausible mechanisms for the cosmological
parameter variations that had to be invoked – such explanations did not become
fashionable until the situation was revolutionised [26] on the theoretical side by
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the rise of modern superstring theories and the attempts to unify them in M-
theory, and on the observational side by the discovery (which surprised everyone,
including superstring theorists) that the expansion of the universe is not undergoing
gravitational deceleration but actually accelerating.
The logic leading to the formula (17) for the zoological clock timescale τ˜ , and
to the corresponding space dimension,
ℓ˜ ≈ ǫ1/2 ǫ˜/ (4 ememp) , (18)
is based on the assumption that, natural selection will tend to maximise the latter
(within the limits imposed by the ambient Galilean gravitational field g) in order to
obtain as large as possible a value for the corresponding corporal particle number,
as given by N˜ ≈ n˜ ℓ˜3 in terms of the particle number density n˜ ≈ (e2me/2)
3 of
water. The value
N˜ ≈ (ǫ1/2 ǫ˜ e/8mp)
3 , (19)
thus obtained for the body – of which the brain, in the human case, is a significant
fraction – will of course be a wide overestimate of what, in view of the haphazard
nature of natural selection, is actually likely to be achieved in practice, but the
limit given by (18) has occasionally been approached in a few gigantic cases such
as that of the brontosaurus. As a fraction of the number N⊕
.
= M⊕/mp this is
expressible as the relation
N˜/N⊕ ≈ (ǫ˜/16)
3 ≈ 10−17 , (20)
in which the right hand side is a purely arithmetical quantity whose extremely
small value does not depend on any empirical parameter (such as the proton mass
mp with which it is numerically comparable) but is just a consequence of the
complexity of biochemical processes. Its cube root – of the order of a millionth
– characterises the maximum size ratio, ℓ˜/R⊕ , for a land animal with the same
kind of biochemistry as ours, not just on any inhabitable planets within our own
or nearby galaxies, but even in other parts of the multiverse (where quantities such
as e and mp need not have the values that are familiar). More particularly and
memorably, on any such planet, the maximum land animal size ℓ˜ will be of the
order of a thousandth of the atmospheric thickness (and the maximum mountain
height) which – as remarked above in the discussion of (14) – will itself be of the
order of a thousandth of the planetary radius R⊕ given by (8).
In conclusion, assuming that mental processing benefits from maximisation of
the number of particles in the brain and therefor of its host body, it can be seen
from (19) that the strong anthropic principle will favor regions of the multiverse in
which the ratio e/mp is very large, that is to say where the ratio of gravitational
to electric coupling is very small.
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